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Abstract
Responding to seemingly intractable levels of long-term unemployment and more
recently arising from fiscal austerity, many countries have re-examined their ap-
proach to activating the unemployed. This re-examination has altered the role of
the public employment service from provider to commissioner of services and cre-
ated quasi-markets in the delivery of labour market programmes. The purpose of
this review is to examine the success of these markets and to determine if the design
of Britain’s Work Programme reflects lessons learned in other countries. We con-
clude that a thorough review of international experience and a measure of patience
while the Flexible New Deal ran its course, would have informed the Programme’s
design and commissioning model. These flaws, combined with a depressed eco-
nomic climate, will make it impossible for the Programme to demonstrate expected
levels of additionality in terms of job outcomes.
JEL: D02, H11, H53, I38, L24
Introduction
Responding to seemingly intractable levels of long-term unemployment and more
recently arising from fiscal austerity, many countries have re-examined their ap-
proach to activating the unemployed. This re-examination has challenged tradi-
tional models of welfare state delivery, altered the role of the public employment
service from provider to commissioner of services and sought to redefine the rights
and obligations of the unemployed themselves. The result of this new ‘contractual-
ism’ has been the creation of quasi-markets in the delivery of employment services
and labour market programmes (Nunn et al., 2009; Sol and Westerveld, 2005; Finn,
2010). This process of marketisation describes the imposition of market forces on
public services which have traditionally been delivered and financed by local and
central government. In 2006 60 percent of employment services provision in the
UK was in the public sector, with the remainder evenly split between for-profit
and non-profit providers. In Germany, Poland, Sweden and the Czech Republic
however, public institutions were responsible for 80 percent of such spending (EC,
2008: p. 37).
The performance of these quasi-markets in employment services has recently
come to fore with allegations of fraud against a prime contractor on Britain’s flag-
ship Work Programme. The purpose of this review is to examine the success
of markets in outsourced employment services and to determine if the design of
Britain’s Work Programme reflects lessons learned elsewhere.
The ‘Proper’ Scope of Government?
Welfare reform in the UK has proceeded apace since the election of a Conservative-
Liberal Democrat coalition government in 2010. Elected on a mandate of fiscal
responsibility, localism and of championing ‘big society’ (best understood as the
antonym of ‘big government’), their intentions for reform of the public services
were recently outlined in the following White Paper on Open Public Services:
“To improve quality for all, and particularly for the most vulnera-
ble, we are determined to open up the provision of the public services
and target funding at the most disadvantaged... Improvements will be
driven by putting the needs of citizens before producer interest, by us-
ing data transparency to put real information in people’s hands, and
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by decentralising power to ensure that public service providers are ac-
countable to the people that use them rather than to centralised bureau-
cracies... This means replacing top-down monopolies with open net-
works in which diverse and innovative providers compete to provide
the best and most efficient services for the public.” (HM Government,
2012: p. 3)
Oliver Hart et al. (1997) explored the issue of when government should provide
a service in-house and when should provision be contracted-out. To proponents,
contracting out enables the delivery of public services at lower cost (Savas, 1982;
Logan, 1990), while critics assert that the quality of contracted-out services is often
inferior to that delivered by public employees (Shichor, 1995).
The traditional approach within economics to the contracting out of public
services usually dealt with issues of moral hazard, the form of competition in
newly created markets and of information incompleteness between contracting par-
ties (Laffont and Tirole, 1993; Tirole, 1994; Vickers and Yarrow, 1988; Schmidt,
1996; Shapiro and Willig, 1990). In the context of employment services, Koning
et al. (2007) describes scenarios where the profit motive introduces moral hazard
wherein a contractor knows the quality of its service is difficult to observe, where
a large degree of information asymmetry exists between providers and their clients
(who may participate on credence, or by mandatory referral) and where the assess-
ment of a provider’s true additionality is confounded by external factors such as
the business cycle or simply demand for labour.
While the problems of incomplete and asymmetric information are possibly
endemic in agency, Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991, 1994) demonstrate that pro-
viding an agent with incentives to achieve a specific outcome is likely to result in
the shirking of other – mandated but unrewarded – outcomes such as quality. This
insight is critical as it speaks to the ability of open services initiatives to deliver
improvements in service quality over and above that pertaining to direct provision.
Hart et al. (1997) hold that the cost and benefits of contracting out hinge on the
assumption of contractual incompleteness given that the quality of service desired
by a principal is often difficult to fully specify. In the context of labour market
programmes a measure of political ambiguity tends exist around the justification
for any intervention in the labour market. For instance, a socially benevolent pro-
gramme may invest in training the unemployed to achieve a human capital out-
come at the individual level; a less expensive programme might concentrate solely
on matching candidates to vacancies and promote a ‘work first’ ethos. The end-to-
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end delivery of human capital type schemes is likely to be more difficult to con-
tract as it would involve mandating training quality (and learning outcomes) over a
wide spectrum of courses. On the other hand a ‘work first’ programme that places
employment outcomes before job-match quality or sustainability of employment,
carries less risk of contractual incompleteness as the desired level of service (i.e.
immediate employment) is easily observed.
Hart et al. (1997: p. 1129) remark that, “a private contractor generally has a
stronger incentive both to improve quality and to reduce costs ... but [their] incen-
tive to engage in cost reduction is typically too strong since [it] ignores the adverse
impact on quality.” This observation is acutely relevant for a labour market inter-
vention purporting to offer tailored support to the unemployed, as the quality of this
support will be closely tied to overall costs. They conclude, “in general, the big-
ger the adverse consequences of (noncontractible) cost cutting on (noncontractible)
quality, the stronger is the case for in-house provision.”
Experiences of Contracting-Out of Employment Services
Finn (2011) reviewed the literature on employment services subcontracting in reform-
minded European countries including the United States, Australia, Britain, Ger-
many, and the Netherlands. He focussed on the development and characteristics
of subcontracting relationships, the types of activities they deliver and the impact
on employment outcomes. His findings suggest that private providers can, “un-
der certain contractual arrangements, improve outcomes for particular groups and
bring innovation to service delivery. The competitive pressure they bring may also
prompt improved PES performance.” His findings are very much at odds with Hart
et al. (1997) who maintain that the incentives arising from residual control rights
(behaviour in uncontracted scenarios) are more important than any benefits arising
from competition.1
While the US Job Training Partnership Act of 1984 is usually cited as the
first major example of performance-related contracting in employment services,
the UK’s experience may also be traced to the Training and Enterprise Councils of
1987. These private sector bodies delivered a range of training and employment
programmes with a portion their funding dependent not solely on job outcomes but
on qualifications obtained during participation (Bennett et al., 1994). New Labour
1Hart et al. (1997) were writing in the context of proposed privatisation of prisons in the United
States.
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continued the reform agenda by testing a number of outcomes-based contracts in-
cluding Employment Zones (targeting the long-term unemployed) and Pathways
(targeting those in receipt of disability benefits2. While the zone model was found
to have “somewhat” better outcomes than other New Deal programmes, Pathways
largely failed to secure job outcomes and thus contracts fell into jeopardy as rev-
enue streams did not materialise. According to NAO (2010: p. 27), Pathways suf-
fered from a poorly designed procurement process which had encouraged providers
to over-commit, resulting in more conservative but realistic bids being written-off
as outliers.
Since introducing a fully privatised market in employment services in 1998,
Australia have worked on several iterations of their Job Network programme to
improve its efficiency and adjust incentives for providers. While initial contracts
adopted a ‘black box’ approach entailing large amounts of autonomy and the con-
centration of revenue in outcome-based payments, by its fourth iteration Job Ser-
vices Assistance included access to a pathway fund encouraging providers to per-
sonalise services and the training needs of their clients. Arising from many con-
troversies over gaming of the system, other adjustments to the Australian model
have included: ring fencing of funds for services to job-seekers; loading perfor-
mance measures toward outcomes for the most disadvantaged; capturing service
quality as a key performance indicator; and intervening to review contracts where
allegations of parking have been made (Finn, 2010: p. 295).
The Dutch social insurance agency, UWV, began contracting-out employment
services in 2003. Reviews have shown that while their move from partial to full
outcome payments did succeed in raising overall job placement rates, no effect
was observed for harder-to-help clients including those transitioning from disabil-
ity benefits (Koning and Heinrich, 2010). That many of these additional jobs lasted
for less than a year indicates job-seekers may have been placed in poorly matched,
unsustainable or even bogus employment. To overcome criticisms of standardised
or generic trajectories employed by contractors, greater personalisation of treat-
ment has been enabled by the introduction of individual budgets – equipping clients
with greater power to negotiate their re-integration paths with case managers. More
recently some Dutch local authorities have brought case management and initial as-
sessment back in-house. While re-integration services are still contracted out, local
authorities have come to favour a ‘modular’ commissioning strategy over end-to-
2Multiple evaluations of each scheme are published on the National Audit Office website, http:
//nao.gov.uk
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end contracts as the former are easier to monitor and measure (Plantinga et al.,
2011).
Arising from a Commission led by Peter Hartz, Germany began a process of
modernising labour regulations and reforming their public employment service,
Bundesagentur für Arbeit (BA), over a decade ago. Among the changes to employ-
ment services have been the introduction of benefit sanctions for poor job-search or
job avoidance and greater private sector contestability in service delivery. Follow-
ing legal changes in 2003, local BA offices were obliged to follow public procure-
ment rules when letting employment service contracts. According to Schneider
(2008), BA responded to this by centralising contracting and controlling costs by
emphasising price competition. However, the unforeseen consequences of central-
isation and efficiency targets were a reduction in the number of local providers,
the emergence of supra-regional providers and an actual decline in competition.
Notwithstanding this, the UK Work Programme has adopted a centralised system
of large-scale and high-value contracting.
Finn (2011: p. 5) proposes a number of lessons from his review of international
best practice:
1. Implementing an effective contracting system is a developmental process
and requires an iterative process of monitoring, evaluation and modification.
2. Selection processes that have given too much weight to the lowest priced
bids have resulted in poor or unviable contracts.
3. Contracting requires comprehensive IT systems that enable contracting au-
thorities to track participants, monitor provider performance and to verify
the quality of service and delivery of outcomes.
4. Contracting agencies need to independently monitor customer experiences
and ensure that robust systems are in place to deal with complaints of poor
service delivery (e.g. parking).
5. Contracting large and complex systems involves a steep learning curve and it
takes time to steer the system to minimise perverse incentives and to capture
the efficiencies and innovation that contractors may offer.
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Britain’s New Work Programme
The current Work Programme owes its genesis to a commissioning strategy doc-
ument published by the Department for Work & Pensions (DWP) in 2008, also
under New Labour. The strategy, which responded to recommendations from the
Freud Report and closely echoed Hartz reforms in Germany, explicitly aimed to
marketise the provision of employment services by letting comprehensive, end-to-
end contracts to a small number of ‘prime’ providers. Outlining their vision, DWP
(2010) proposed that by 2011 the public service would handle benefit administra-
tion and early job-matching while more intensive assistance would be managed by
prime contractors.
The Work Programme is an integrated workfare programme implemented in
England, Scotland and Wales in June of 2011. It replaced around 20 pre-existing
schemes, each operating under different delivery models, outcome definitions, and
contracting and incentive structures (e.g. Employment Zones, Flexible New Deal,
New Deal and Pathways to Work).3
The department has contracted eighteen prime providers to manage employ-
ment services in forty contract areas. The ‘primes’ may choose to operate services
directly or to subcontract to an end-to-end agent who in turn may engage various
specialist/spot contractors to fulfil specific training etc. In total there 785 separate
organisations4 involved in the Work Programme’s diffuse supply chain.
Job Centre Plus refers a claimant to a prime contractor after handling their
initial job search. Referrals are mandatory for those in receipt of Jobseekers Al-
lowance (JSA) and prison-leavers, although more complicated referral criteria ap-
ply to those in receipt of Incapacity Benefits and Employment Support Allowance.
Claimants are classified into one of nine groups depending on their perceived readi-
ness to work, with prime providers receiving differential outcome payments based
on the ‘difficulty’ of returning members of each group to work. The total payment
for returning a job-seeker aged 18-24 to employment is £3,810, while larger pay-
ments of £13,720 attach to more difficult cases (i.e. those formerly in receipt of
Incapacity Benefit and now transitioned to Employment Support Allowance).
Payments are made to providers under a payment-by-results regime and in a
series of stages; each stage reflects the achievement of job outcome successes.
Thus:
3The remainder of this section largely follows NAO (2012a).
4This figure was correct as of July 2012. See http://www.dwp.gov.uk/docs/wp-supply-chains.xls
for updates.
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Attachment Payment: for taking a claimant on to the Programme. The attach-
ment fee reduces to nil by the start of the fourth year.
Job Outcome Payment: When a claimant has been in work for either a continu-
ous or cumulative period of employment.
Outcome Sustainment Payment: A further payment every four weeks for keep-
ing a claimant in employment.
Incentive Payment: For jobs delivered beyond a given performance level – de-
fined by DWP as 30 per cent above non-intervention levels.
Early Reviews of the Work Programme
Commissioned by the Department for Work & Pensions (DWP), Newton et al.
(2012) presented preliminary findings based on qualitative research forming part
of the official evaluation of the Work Programme’s first year in operation. They
sampled six of the eighteen Contract Package Areas, interviewing staff and cus-
tomers and observing frontline contact between providers and customers.5
Referring to the random allocation of customers to prime providers within a
contract area, DWP staff acknowledged that while randomisation prevented selec-
tion based on a customer’s profile (known as ‘creaming’) it prevented DWP staff
from making referrals in the customer’s best interest. For example, where a par-
ticular provider would have been preferred based on their experience of meeting
specialist needs, their proximity to a customer’s home or taking into account travel
arrangements for rural dwellers.
Despite having the flexibility to tailor delivery by engaging specialist or spot
contractors, the report finds that use of specialists varied widely and that this varia-
tion reflected attempts to control cost. Specialist subcontractors were typically en-
gaged to deal with employability training, sector-specific training, work placement,
vacancy searching health management and addiction counselling. Concern for tar-
gets and finance was found to come before participant needs in at least one of the
provider interviews conducted. In cases where specialist subcontractors were en-
gaged, the process of providing feedback to main providers was varied and ranged
5The authors caution that care should be exercised in generalising their findings as the research
is qualitative in nature and conducted at an early stage of the Work Programme. In all, several waves
of research are being undertaken, employing a mix of cross-sectional and longitudinal designs. A
subsequent report examining the programme’s commissioning model is expected later in 2013.
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from regular updates to no contact at all. While specialist contractors worked par-
ticularly well for specific groups of participants (e.g. new mothers returning to
the labour force after childbirth), occasional relationship difficulties including un-
derperformance and excessive cost did arise. Some spot providers, contracted by
primes or their end-to-end agents, reported having no budget for specialist training
and were instead focussing their help on job ready customers (known as ‘skim-
ming’).
Newton et al. (2012) note that the discretion (‘black box’ approach) afforded
to primes in how they manage contracts with end-to-end and spot providers, con-
tributed to variation in the extent to which selective outcomes for job ready cus-
tomers were promoted over more complex cases who may be furthest from the
labour market (known as ‘parking’). In some cases, subcontracted staff had a
lack of knowledge of the minimum delivery standards committed to by the prime
provider.
The flexibility to provide personalised, tailored support has been vaunted as a
core innovation of the Work Programme model. Referring to personalisation, New-
ton et al. (2012) find evidence of procedural – though not of substantive – person-
alisation in programme delivery. They report that providers’ initial assessments of
customers varied in depth and quality, as did their technique of assessing job readi-
ness. The report notes that action plans agreed during initial assessments were
sometimes computer-generated or generic in nature, and that referrals to generic
training did not always reflect individual needs. The report concludes that person-
alisation amounted to streaming at group level and to variation in the frequency of
advisor meetings at the individual level. The report finds that in practice, job ready
customers were more likely to receive weekly meetings with a personal advisor
while customers originating from Employment Support Allowance (ESA) were
seen at six week intervals or counselled over the phone.6
“Meaningful contact is fairly vague. It doesn’t have to be face-
to-face or an individual appointment, it could be a telephone call or
participation in a group employability session. We like this, we can
be more flexible according to customer needs. We don’t need to bring
people into the office for the sake of it and it helps keep costs down.”
(Manager, generalist end-to-end provider, quoted in Newton et al.
(2012: p. 26))
6ESA customers were not subject to mandatory referral or benefit sanction.
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Overall the report describes the Programme’s approach as being dominated by
a ‘work first’ ethos with limited focus on developing customer’s human capital or
employability. It cites examples of customers who were sent forward to interviews
lacking basic certification in the relevant industry (e.g. Construction Skills Cer-
tificate, security licence, CRB check) in anticipation of these costs being met by
subsequent employers. In other cases, training opportunities were withheld un-
til candidates received a definite job offer. By contrast some providers adopted a
hybrid model of combining active job search with work- or specific-skills training.
Newton et al. (2012: p. 111) are cautious of making any conclusions in re-
lation to the creaming and parking of candidates as none have yet completed the
Programme’s full cycle. However, they underscore earlier observations that job-
ready candidates are seen on a more frequent basis by many providers. A potential
implication of this bias is that those with high or multiple barriers to work may
experience a lack of referral to additional support and training activities.
Complementing the work of Newton et al., the National Audit Office (NAO,
2012a) conducted an early review of the design and commissioning of the Work
Programme. While generally supportive of the move to consolidate the number
of labour market programmes and to address weaknesses in earlier schemes (pro-
viding greater flexibility to providers, allowing for longer and earlier intervention,
offering staged and differentiated payments for different cohorts), they point to
weaknesses in the commissioning model arising from hast and aggressive assump-
tions on the part of DWP and prime providers.
The NAO believes the Programme’s feasibility is underpinned by assumptions
about likely performance which are unrealistic, given the outcomes achieved on
similar programmes and the current economic climate. DWP’s expectation of an
overall job placement rate of 36 percent has obvious implications for the viability
of business models structured around staged payments related to job outcomes.
Looking at a specific cohort common to both the Work Programme and ear-
lier Flexible New Deal (JSA aged 25+), DWP anticipate a placement rate of 40
percent but this cohorts’ outcomes were typically half of that (26 percent) under
previous programmes. Perhaps more sobering is that NAO’s estimate is two per-
centage points higher than DWP’s counterfactual outcome (the job finding rate
without intervention) across all cohorts. NAO caution that if these optimistic tar-
gets and revenue streams are not realised, providers may be encouraged to protect
their profits by over-looking hard-to-help claimants, reducing service levels and by
placing disproportionate pressure on subcontractors.
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The NAO is critical of DWP’s use of a common non-intervention counterfac-
tual nationwide, as this does not reflect the relative difficulty of achieving national
targets in contract areas with a higher density of unemployment or greater inci-
dence of long-term unemployment. It seems likely that the business models of
providers in these high unemployment areas will come under most pressure, and
that the specific risks identified by the NAO are most likely to occur in there also.
Whereas previous changes to employment services had been designed and
tested over a four year period, NAO report that ministers “required” DWP to imple-
ment the Work Programme within twelve months. As a consequence, no business
case was prepared until after ministers had committed to the Programme, no alter-
natives were considered, no pilot undertaken, and no time was taken to await the
evaluation of existing programmes. A further cost of the Programme’s accelerated
introduction has been £68 million in termination payments due to Flexible New
Deal contractors – ten of whom are now prime providers on the Work Programme.
The NAO believes the “unprecedented levels of performance” and high price
discounts promised by prime contractors increase the risk that they will be tempted
to game the contract or to seek concessions from DWP. They believe it is likely that
providers will attempt to recalibrate prices and other conditions during the contract
period and that one or more providers may get into serious financial difficulties.
Conclusion
It seems reasonable that the performance of the Work Programme be judged against
the putative benefits of letting outcome-based contracts. For Finn (2010), outcome
based procurement offers the potential for innovation, flexibility and efficiency
savings. Similar points are made by Pattison (2012) who also cites value for money
(VfM) and flexibility in contracting, through the avoidance of public procurement
rules, as key advantages of contracting out employment services.
Setting aide VfM which will be keenly watched by the National Audit Office
in subsequent reports, we argue that certain features in the design of the Work Pro-
gramme undermine the potential for other putative benefits to be realised. While
subcontracts let by prime providers (and their agent’s) are not subject to public
procurement rules, evidence from Newton et al. (2012) shows this flexibility to en-
gage spot training is hamstrung by restrictive (or absent) budgets, cost-saving and
a preference for delivering as much as possible in-house.
Although the Work Programme is very much in its infancy and a comprehen-
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sive evaluation of individual outcomes will require many waves of longitudinal
data, this review of early evaluations provides support for a number of tentative
conclusions.
Firstly, many of the design flaws identified in NAO (2012a) and Newton et al.
(2012) were foreseeable and should have been spotted in a review of international
best practice. Notably, Finn (2010, 2011) was commissioned by the European
Commission to report on sub-contracting in public employment services. The evi-
dence contained in that review was collected during the Work Programme’s design
phase.
Secondly, the decision to restrict eligibility to tender for prime provider con-
tracts was unjustifiably exclusive. Ostensibly the Framework for the Provision
of Employment Related Support Services was used to assert that bidders would
have the capacity and expertise to operate Work Programme contracts. A conse-
quence of this approach has been that smaller operators/alliances (with a combined
turnover below £20 million) and charitable bodies (whose deferred incomes in-
flated acid test liabilities) were excluded. An additional hurdle requiring successful
bidders to demonstrate access to working capital of up to £50 million spread over
several years, clearly favoured large, cash-rich firms. Successful bidders have been
assured by DWP that future invitations to tender, including any opportunities that
may arise from a mid-term review of the Work Programme, will only be extended
to Framework bidders thereby locking-in current inequities.7
Thirdly, as a result of this exclusivity only three of the eighteen prime provider
contracts were let to public or third sector bodies. In contrast to systems where
the public employment service was allowed to compete with private providers, the
only public sector representation among successful prime providers is Newcastle
College Group and Working Links8. This raises a question as to why Job Centre
Plus did not also join the preferred bidders Framework and compete against prime
providers?
Fourthly, contracts awarded under the Work Programme are without precedent
in terms of their value and duration. As described in Jones (2012), this was clearly
done to facilitate innovative budget management. Final outcome payments will not
fall due until programme completion at which point they may be offset by sav-
ings in annual managed expenditure (the benefits bill). While attachment and stage
7Response contained in Question and Answer Brief, available at http://www.dwp.gov.uk/docs/
erss_qa.pdf.
8Working Links is a voluntary body, part-owned by the Shareholders Executive on behalf of the
Secretary for Work and Pensions.
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payments will be made to providers, their day-to-day running costs must be met
by private working capital. A direct consequence of this approach (and Frame-
work conditions relating to size, turnover and working capital) is the exclusion of
smaller, regional and third sector bodies from the role of prime provider.
Fifthly, the intentional incompleteness of contracts concerning programme de-
sign (the “black box”), combined with the absence of adequate monitoring and IT
systems in the initial year (NAO, 2012a), has invited fraud and hindered the en-
forcement of agreed ‘minimum service standards’ at all tiers. According to NAO
(2012b: p. 4) there have been 126 investigations into alleged fraud in contracted
employment services since 2006. They estimate the loss to public funds from fraud
and abuse in contracted employment schemes amounted to over half a million
pounds in 2010-11 alone. Prime Provider A4e identified nine possible cases of
fraud and seven possible cases of improper practice following an internal audit of
their New Deal contracts in 2009.
Lastly, the weaker than expected performance of the UK economy since the
Programme’s launch has led to the undershooting of placement rates and outcome
targets. Should the excessively optimistic targets proposed by DWP and prime
providers undermine a provider’s business model, this will in turn accentuate a
host of other risks endemic in employment programmes contracted on a payment-
by-results basis (e.g. skimming of the most able candidates, and the parking of
complex cases facing multiple barriers to employment) and ultimately of provider
exit.
It might reasonably be concluded that a thorough review of international expe-
rience and a measure of patience while live programmes ran their course, would
have informed the design and commissioning of Britain’s Work Programme and
avoided large penalty payments to incumbents on pre-existing schemes. Given
the current economic climate, it will almost certainly be impossible for the Work
Programme to demonstrate the expected levels of additionality in terms of job out-
comes. As is so often said in relation to labour market programmes, their surest
achievement lies in re-ordering the queue of job-seekers – not in reducing it.
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